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After the Denial 
Tom Athanasiou* 
A point of no return can be avoided, even if the tipping level is 
temporarily exceeded.  Ocean and ice sheet inertia permit overshoot, 
provided the climate forcing is returned below the tipping level before 
initiating irreversible dynamic change. 
- James Hansen, et.al, 20081
Any serious discussion of climate change must begin with climate 
science.  And, at this point, any honest evaluation of climate science will 
reveal that climate change is serious indeed.  Despite the dangers of 
apocalyptic rhetoric, it’s not too much to speak of a ‘climate emergency.’ 
Moreover, this emergency presses despite the all the other pathologies of 
modern society, despite the economic crisis and the energy crisis and the 
security crisis and despite even the fact that we live in a world in which 
billions of impoverished people suffer lives of incessant, grinding, daily 
emergency.  This last crisis, in fact, this is exactly where we have to begin. 
There is no choice between climate protection and human development.  We 
shall have both, or we shall have neither. 
In this context, the temptation to temporize is extremely strong, and 
it’s essential to maintain the political discipline needed to heed the lessons 
of an increasingly inconvenient science.  To be sure, considerations of 
framing, strategy, sequencing, tactics, institutional design and, inevitably, 
political tradeoff are entirely legitimate.  However our proper beginning is 
the science, for it illuminates the intractable conditions of the climate 
challenge.  Here, I’ll cite only two items in an accelerating avalanche of 
findings.  The first is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s 
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development of climate stabilization strategies that are fair enough to actually work. 
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1. James Hansen et al., Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim?,
http://arxiv.org/abs/0804.1126 (last revised June 18, 2008) [hereinafter Hansen, Target 
Atmospheric CO2]. 
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(IPCC) Forth Assessment Report (AR4).2  The AR4 is simultaneously the most 
authoritative and influential summary of climate science yet published and, 
at the same time, a lagging and even conservative view of the scientific 
consensus.3  The second is Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim?, 
a recent paper by James Hansen and his team that will hopefully mark the 
long-overdue end of the age of denial.4 
The short version of this long story is that the post-AR4 science (ice 
melt and carbon cycle science in particular) is significantly more challenging 
than AR4 would lead us to believe.  In response, the scientific community 
has become much more forthright about the concentration targets and 
emission trajectories required to meet the climate emergency.  Not that 
many scientists use the “E word” – emergency – but some recent works5 
certainly makes it easier for others to do so, and then to draw conclusions. 
One such conclusion is that our goal, now, has to be to put the total 
decarbonization of the global economy squarely onto the political agenda as 
quickly as humanly possible.  Which, as this paper will argue, means that the 
climate protection agenda has to be expanded to include the protection of 
the poor and the innocent around the world, and the preservation of their 
“right to development.” 
Moreover, this is something of a public secret – widely known but 
rarely remarked.  Certainly it was widely suspected in Bali in December of 
2007, at the U.N. Climate Change Conference, though it was rarely spoken 
from the official platforms, at least not with the blunt simplicity appropriate 
to such a world-changing truth.  Still, the silence is breaking.  The official 
Bali debate was, after all, framed by AR4’s carefully formulated finding that, 
to have a real chance of holding the total warming below 2°C – the 
customary and most widely cited threshold of truly “dangerous” climate 
change – we have to reduce Annex 1 emissions6 to 25 percent to 40 percent 
below 1990 levels by 2020, while at the same time doing our part to ensure 
2. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) FOURTH ASSESSMENT 
REPORT: WORKING GROUP III REPORT MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2007)[hereinafter 
IPCC AR4].  
3. The IPCC is forced by its intergovernmental charter into a measured
conservativism that sometimes leads to excessively conservative treatments of 
emerging science.  See M. Oppenheimer, et al., The Limits of Consensus, 317 SCIENCE 
1505-06 (2007). 
4. Hansen, Target Atmospheric CO2, supra note 1.
5. See David Spratt & Philip Sutton, CLIMATE CODE RED: THE CASE FOR
EMERGENCY ACTION (Scribe Publications 2008), available at http://www. 
climatecodered.net for an overview of explosion in literature on this subject. 
6. The “Annex 1” countries are those that have quantified emissions limitation
targets under the terms of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. 
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“substantial deviation from baseline” emissions in much of the developing 
world.7  Whatever this means, and whether it turns out to be enough, one 
thing is clear: This is hardly business as usual. 
Below is the top of Box 13.7 in AR4’s Working Group III volume,8 the 
source of the 25 percent to50 percent numbers that defined the Bali debate: 
Here is the bad news: this table describes the most stringent scenarios 
(category A) that have been officially reviewed by the IPCC, and while they’re 
unrealistically severe (they aim for a greenhouse gas concentration target of 
450 ppm CO2-equivalent) from the perspective of politics-as-usual (in the 
U.S., even the best of the climate legislation now active in Congress9 calls for
a mere return to 1990 emissions by 2020) they’re still too lax to hold total
global warming to 2°C.10  In fact, if we want a decent chance of holding the
2°C line, we need to stabilize the greenhouse gas concentration of the
atmosphere not at the 450 ppm CO2-equivalent, but at 400 ppm CO2-
equivalent, a considerably lower level.11  Or, as Hansen’s team puts it, after
taking non-CO2 forcings into proper account, this means 350 ppm CO2 “at
most.”12  To put this another way: The IPCC / Bali range of 25 percent to 40
7. IPCC AR4, supra note 2, at 776, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ assessment-
report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-chapter13.pdf.  These figures entered the policy debate by way of 
Box 13.7.  For critical details, see Table TS.2, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-ts.pdf, which shows that all category I scenarios 
(the low-emissions group) have global emissions peaking by 2015. 
8. IPCC AR4, supra note 2, at 776
9. Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act, available at http://www.gov
track.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-309, New Apollo Energy Act of 2007, available at 
http://govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-2809, and Safe Climate Act of 2007, 
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-1590, all intend to 
return U.S. emissions back to their 1990 levels by 2020.  This is quite ambitious, 
when compared to the rest of the bills in U.S. legislative competition, but far short of 
the 25 percent to 40 percent stipulated by the IPCC “category I” scenarios. 
10. Paul Baer et al., THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN A CLIMATE CONSTRAINED WORLD
19-22 (Heinrich Boll Foundation 2007), available at http://www.ecoequity.org/
docs/TheGDRsFramework.pdf [hereinafter Baer, The Right to Development].
11. Id.
12. Hansen, Target Atmospheric CO2, supra note 1, at 1.
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percent Annex-1 reductions by 2020 is imprecise, and too forgiving.  If we 
want a decent chance of holding global warming within manageable limits, 
then today’s atmospheric CO2 concentration (385 ppm CO2) is already too 
high.  This means that, here in Annex 1, we have to shoot for the high end of 
AR4’s 25 percent by 40 percent by 2020 reduction range.  When it comes to 
non-Annex-1, the proper goal is one that underlines and italicizes the IPCC’s 
subtle note about “substantial” reductions from baseline.”  Even so, we’ll 
need a bit of luck as well. 
I. The Structure of the Climate Problem
We are used to presenting the Bali conference as a qualified success,
and indeed it is.  However, it’s also the case that the Bali consensus was 
terribly preliminary.  It doesn’t include any useful guidance on a global 
target.  It doesn’t refer to ‘commitments’ for industrialized countries, except 
when coupled with the undermining phrase “or actions.”13  On the critical 
matter of developing country agreements, or commitments, or actions – 
even the nouns here are explosively controversial – it managed only to 
reveal the edge of a gigantic minefield, and to point, vaguely, in the 
direction by which it must be crossed.  
The revelation came by way of a linkage, in which the search for 
“nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties in the context of 
sustainable development,” was formally acknowledged, but only insofar as it was 
“supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, 
reportable and verifiable manner.”14  This was the key point of contention 
throughout the Bali talks, and this was the short, dry text which led to the 
U.S.’s dramatic isolation, and, on that tense final Saturday, to the overtime
confrontation that saw the Bush administration finally back down from its
attempts to block a near unanimous recognition of historical necessity.
That necessity should be stated clearly: as everyone in Bali knew, the 
“technology, financing and capacity-building.” At the center of the debate 
would ultimately have to come by way of an international mobilization in 
which the wealthy, somehow, some way, came to accept the simple reality 
that they alone have the money to decisively act.15 
This issue is not even close to being resolved, but it has been 
illuminated.  This allows us to clearly state the essentials of the problem, 
and to do so with new salience.  The reason finance and technology transfer 
are so critical is that dramatic reductions in developing world emissions are 
13. An “action” is undermining because it has no legal definition.  A
commitment is quantified and binding. 
14. Climate Change Conference, December 3-14, 2007, Bali Action Plan, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2007/L.7/Rev.1 (December 14, 2007). 
15. Id.
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now an absolute necessity.  Yet, at the same time, the developing world 
negotiators consider economic growth and poverty alleviation to be their 
utmost priorities, and are extremely suspicious of any climate agreement 
that would require reductions without ensuring that those reductions will 
not impede the development of the nations that they represent. This 
tension – between the demands of the climate and the development of the 
South – is at the very center of the global climate impasse.  
The situation can be clearly illustrated, as for example in the following 
graph, which is taken from the second editions of a recent report, The Right to 
Development in a Climate Constrained World: The Greenhouse Development Rights 
Framework.16 
The story here is the story of the future; it’s as simple as it is 
significant.  Think of it as a story that involves a little bit of science, a little 
bit of conjecture, and a little bit of arithmetic. 
The uppermost line is the science (2°C Emergency pathway). It 
represents the global emissions trajectory we need if we’re to avoid a true 
climate catastrophe.  Here this trajectory is drawn, optimistically, to give us 
a reasonable likelihood of keeping the warming below 2°C.  It shows a 
emergency pathway – and there’s no denying its ambition – that has global 
emissions peaking by 2020 and then declining 80 percent by mid-century. 
Yet note that even this pathway, one that would require an unprecedented 
global mobilization, implies considerable climate risks, for it would leave us 
16. Baer, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT, supra note 10, at 59.
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with a roughly 20 percent to 35 percent probability of exceeding 2°C of 
warming.  It cannot, by any means, be said to be “safe.”  
The lowermost line is the conjecture (Annex 1 physical emissions). 
It supposes that the wealthy countries will accept their obligation to make 
very ambitious domestic cuts.  Thus, the blue line supposes that all Annex 1 
countries – the U.S. and Canada, Europe, Russia – manage to reduce their 
emissions as quickly and as deeply as Al Gore, for example, has called for.17  
It shows a 90 percent reduction in emissions (below 1990) by 2050 in all 
those countries, and thus it illustrates the still-significant portion of the 
extremely small remaining global carbon budget that the North would 
consume even if it were to honestly follow a frankly ambitious course of 
emissions reductions. 
Now, if the North managed such a feat, what would it imply in the 
South?  Here’s where we come to the arithmetic.   
The middle line shows how much of the limited remaining global 
carbon budget would be left for the use of the South (Non-Annex 
physical emissions).  It is not much.  In fact, to hold this line, the South 
would need to develop along a path that peaks and declines by 2020, and do 
so while its people are, on average, still quite poor.  Which is precisely the 
source of the tension between climate protection and development, 
precisely the challenge of climate stabilization in this our very bitterly 
divided world. 
II. Squaring the Circle
It always seems impossible until it’s done. 
- Nelson Mandela
An impasse, by definition, offers no obvious way forward.  However, 
this time there are many ways; if they’re not obvious, perhaps we’re looking 
in the wrong places.  While most of the climate literature turns around 
technology and economics, we in fact have the tools needed to build, or at 
least begin to build, a post-greenhouse world.  Moreover, we can afford to 
do so in the scarce time remaining.  
Why then the impasse?  Part of the answer, is North/South politics.  In 
and of itself however, it is not a sufficient answer.  For one thing, North and 
South are divided between rich and poor. This division is as critical, and for 
most people more immediate, than that between the developed and the 
developing world.  For another, our politics is clearly too narrowly 
17. Dan Shapely, Gore Calls For 90% CO2 Reduction, THE DAILY GREEN: THE 
CONSUMER’S GUIDE TO THE GREEN REVOLUTION, June 29, 2007, http://www.thedailygreen. 
com/environmental-news/latest/3083. 
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conceived, particularly given the scope and urgency of the climate and 
development challenges.  Which is not to say that a new politics – one of 
emergency, and possibility, and hope – will come easily or that we have a 
luxury of time within which to build it.  If the climate agenda must be 
broadened to include the development crisis, and even the rich poor divide, 
doesn’t this just make it even more overwhelming?  What is the way 
forward?  What are the ways that make strategic and not merely tactical 
sense? 
The answers are many.  To sort out the key issues, we’ll have to 
approach them concretely, in terms of specific debates about specific 
technologies and specific institutions.  However, in a period of emergency – 
a period, as Churchill said, of consequences18 – it will not do to imagine that 
debates about nuclear power, or carbon sequestration, or emissions trading, 
are discreet debates about small, particular things.  Nor will it do to imagine 
that we can avoid the overarching questions of developmental justice in a 
climate constrained world.  Indeed, they surround us on every side. 
Consider Jim Hansen’s claim that: 
Continued growth of greenhouse gas emissions, for just another 
decade, practically eliminates the possibility of near-term return of 
atmospheric composition beneath the tipping level for catastrophic 
effects.  The most difficult task, phase-out over the next 20-25 years of 
coal use that does not capture CO2, is Herculean, yet feasible when 
compared with the efforts that went into World War II . . .19 
This is not a realistic claim as we usually understand the term.  For it is 
not merely a call for “no new coal,” or a call for “no new coal that doesn’t 
capture CO2.”  It is a call to shut down all coal, everywhere, existing or new, 
that does not capture CO2.  But what would this entail?  What would it cost? 
Who would pay that cost?  Who would pay the cost in the developing world? 
By what means and via what institutions?  And if we were to set out on this 
path, how would we avoid empowering the nuclear lobby?  Or facilitating the 
damming of every remaining rift and gorge, throughout the world?  How, in 
the midst of all the imperatives of retail economics and domestic 
realpolitics, in which energy mobilization and the climate transition 
18. Winston Churchill, The Locust Years, speech given to House of Commons
(Nov. 12, 1936) (transcript available at http://www.churchill-society-london. 
org.uk/Locusts.html).  Churchill was speaking of procrastination and delay in the face 
of grave threat.  The full quote is, “The era of procrastination, of half-measures, of 
soothing and baffling expedients, of delays, is coming to its close.  In its place we are 
entering a period of consequences.” 
19. Hansen, Target Atmospheric CO2, supra note 12, at 13.  See also http://dotearth.
blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/19/back-to-1988-on-co2-says-nasas-hansen/. 
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compete on every side with other critical issues for scarce attention and 
resources, can we find the find the drive and will to make all this so, in time 
and on the necessary scale? 
One thing that is clear is that we’ve been remiss, sloppy, even self-
indulgent.  That we have somehow failed to prepare the ground for battles 
that, now, we have no choice but to engage.  It’s time to seek ways forward 
that take proper account of what is, or rather what must become, the 
fundamental fact of political life – the politics of emergency are not the 
politics of business-as-usual, but rather, and fundamentally, the politics of 
solidarity.  These will not come easily to the climate movement as we know 
it, which has not generally allowed itself to cast large enough nets, or to 
imagine real solutions.  Solutions that can work globally and, just as 
importantly, solutions that can work now.  Right now. 
The good news is that the winds of a new realism are blowing strong. 
An increasingly self-conscious effort to unearth and refine the critical 
elements of an adequate strategy is now visible, all around us.  But just as 
new answers are emerging at the grassroots20 so too a new international 
climate justice campaign has also emerged.  This international campaign is, 
by agenda and by science, tightly bound to the international climate 
negotiations themselves.  It is to be sure far less well known than the rank-
and-file battles for community-level rebirth and solidarity that form the 
foundation of the traditional environmental justice movement.  However, it 
seeks a kind of justice that would be conceived and institutionalized within 
the climate treaty itself, and thus may well be just as critical to our eventual 
success. 
Simply put, the issue is developmental equity.  More precisely, it is 
protecting the right to developmental equity in this a world where extremely 
rapid global emissions reductions are visibly preconditions of future well-
being and stability.  A world, moreover, where Southern decision makers 
have entirely reasonable justifications for fearing that, all else being equal, 
rapid global emissions reductions will fatally undermine their access to 
development itself, or at least, development as we know it today. 
The formal problem is “principle based differentiation,” a phrase that, 
translated from policy lingo into simple English, means nothing more that 
finding transparently fair ways of dividing the burdens and efforts of the global 
greenhouse transition.  Here, in the interests of full disclosure, I must say 
that I am very much a partisan of particular approach – the Greenhouse 
Development Rights (GDR) approach – which is described below.  Though 
just now the details of the GDR framework matter less than the larger 
problem it aims to solve: how, in a political world that is defined by tactical 
20. For example, the US drive for “green collar jobs” has already dreamt larger
dreams, and won greater momentum, that any earlier American blue/green 
campaign. 
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and positional games, power politics, prisoners dilemmas and ad hoc 
trade-offs, can we move into a new global climate protection framework 
that’s fair enough to actually work.  
One problem deserves special attention, the problem of the North’s 
obligations to the South.  For these are both large and absolutely critical. 
Simply put, if the rich countries do not provide the technology and finance needed to drive 
an emergency program of clean energy development in the South, then there is virtually no 
hope of avoiding a global climate catastrophe.  Yet, the climate movement in the 
North has done almost nothing to prepare the ground for this, the most 
daunting of all climate related challenges. 
The U.S. climate movement, in particular, has focused almost 
exclusively on building domestic momentum by any means necessary, and 
to that end has actively and consciously avoided the tough international 
questions.  The problem of the U.S. necessarily pivotal role in financing an 
emergency climate transition is specifically seen as a problem to be 
deferred.  Even worse, the logic of such demurral is as strong as the logic of 
its refutation.  After all, who will bear the risks of too much frank and honest 
speech?  Who will argue, particularly given the fateful choices now facing the 
U.S., that there’s no danger in a climate politics that the Right will
predictably attack as a call to “write checks to China?”  Only those who study
the science and who allow themselves to see the implication – that without
an global obligation-based accord any U.S. victory will be a pyrrhic one
that’s fated to be almost immediately overtaken by international events.
Only those who see that the climate endgame has already arrived, and that
we’ve no choice but to play it with the pieces at hand.
III. Greenhouse Development Rights
This endgame has become quite dramatic.  Despite the fact that we
have the means to prevent a true catastrophe, it is hard to see how the 
climate impasse will be resolved in time and in a manner that will avoid 
such a catastrophe.  It’s in this context that the GDR experiment was 
launched, with the goal of understanding the deep structure of the impasse 
in a “policy relevant” way, one that’s clear enough to help us break it.  Here, 
briefly, are some of the key features of the GDR approach.21 
GDR builds upon the official principles of the U.N.’s Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, which states that signatory states should 
“protect the climate system . . . on the basis of equity and in accordance with 
their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities.”22  In other words, on the basis of their responsibility and their 
21. Baer, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT, supra note 10.
22. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf, Article 3, paragraph 1.  
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capacity.  The GDR framework combines the two into a single obligation 
indicator to determine both national obligations to mitigate and national 
obligations to support adaption.  The latter, though it’s often treated as 
secondary, is anything but.  A great deal of suffering and destruction is 
inherent in the destabilized climate system and it cannot be ignored.  This is 
not merely an ethical or moral claim; there are excellent reasons to doubt 
the viability of any climate protection framework that seeks to ignore or even 
minimize the global adaptation need. 
Obligations can’t be the whole story; rights also matter.  However, 
rather than asserting, for example, an equal per-capita right to emit, the 
GDR framework seeks to preserve a right to dignified level of sustainable 
human development, even in the presence of a global climate crisis that 
radically restricts the use of fossil energy.  Obligations are only a means to 
an end, a means to ensure that each nation does its fair share of whatever 
needs to be done.  If the total burden of global climate protection turns out 
to be small (unlikely at this point) then even the U.S. – a wealthy country 
with a large historical responsibility – will have a small obligation.  But if 
this burden turns out to be large, then, critically, the fairness of the system, 
and the transparency and comprehensibility of the rules by which it is 
determined, will be absolutely critical.  Obscure deals and ad hoc 
arrangements, like those that underlie Kyoto’s original annex structure, will 
not do. 
The GDR approach solves a number of problems.  Most importantly, it 
means that a nation’s obligations are not limited to the mitigation of its 
emissions.  And why should they be?  Why, given the massive fraction of the 
global carbon budget that’s been consumed by the wealthy countries, and 
the horrifying impacts that these historical emissions will have on others, 
should their obligations be limited to the mitigation of their own future 
emissions?  And why should we believe that, if they are so limited, a 
solution to the climate problem will even be possible? 
If there’s a single greatest problem in climate politics, it’s economic 
and developmental inequality.  How, after all, can obligations be fairly 
apportioned in a world divided between wealthy and developing nations?  
The answer is that it cannot be, and that obligations must be apportioned 
between wealthy and developing individuals.  The GDR framework of course 
recognizes that this is a world of nations, and that, ultimately, it is nations 
and not individuals that must accept and discharge the obligations of any 
climate treaty.  But it nevertheless defines a nation’s obligations as the sum 
of the obligations of the individuals living that nation. 
This solves the classic “Germany within India” problem.23  Under the 
GDR framework, India, like any developing country, has the obligations 
23. Paul Baer, et al., The Right to Development in a Carbon Constrained World: Second Edition 
Executive Summary, October 2008, available at http://www.ecoequity.org/GDRs/GDRs_ 
 West  Northwest, Vol. 15, No. 1, Winter 2009 
33 
appropriate to its wealthy, or relatively wealthy (we speak in terms of a 
“consuming class”) sub-population.  This is illustrated in the following 
graphic: 
The curves here represent reasonable approximations of the income 
distributions within these three key countries.  Each chart depicts a national 
population in terms of its income distribution, from the poorest to the 
richest.  The first thing to notice is the horizontal line at $9,000 per person 
per year (in purchasing power parity terms) that represents the GDR 
“development threshold.”  This is a global threshold, and it is emphatically 
not an extreme poverty line.  Rather, it represents a defensible definition of 
the threshold of real development.24  
The second thing to notice is that the fraction of the national 
population with incomes above the development threshold is shown in 
black.  These black areas represent our definition of national capacity.  So if 
we think of the GDR burden sharing system as a global income tax, the 
development threshold can be thought of as marking a “0 percent tax 
ExecSummary.html.  The problem here is that though, in per capita terms, there are far 
fewer wealthy individuals in India than in Germany, India also has a far larger total 
population.  So, it has long been presumed, there may be just as many rich individuals in 
absolute terms.  This, as it turns out, is not the case, but the problem – how to account for 
the rich sub-population of a poor country within a simple North/South model, is a real 
one. 
24. Baer, supra note 10, at 36.
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bracket,” set so as to shield the resources of those who’ve not yet reached 
the development threshold. 
You can see that a very small portion of India’s population, less than 1 
percent, earns more than the $9,000 development threshold.  A much larger 
portion (nearly 90 percent) of the U.S. population has earnings about this 
threshold.  China falls between India and the US.  Its consuming class is 
about 10 percent of its population – about one-third of the size of the US 
population, and it has a much smaller aggregate capacity – roughly 
one-fifteenth of the US aggregate capacity.  
The US, despite its much smaller population, has the lion’s share of 
the capacity.  In addition, it has a similarly disproportionate national 
responsibility, and, combining the two, quite a large fraction of the global 
obligation to act.  Indeed, the Greenhouse Development Rights system tells 
us that the US has about 33 percent of the global obligation, while China 
has about 5 percent.25  These are striking numbers, and they have extremely 
significant political implications.   
Right off the top, they mean that the parity implied by the now 
innumerable press reports that Chinese emissions have or will soon exceed 
US emissions is utter nonsense, for it takes no account of developmental 
equity, historical emissions, or capacity to pay.  Even more significantly, 
they mean that the impasse between North and South, an impasse that 
threatens to condemn us to mitigation pathways too narrow and too slow to 
avert catastrophe, could actually be resolved.  This is true because a global 
accord in which each nation pays its fair share is actually possible.  Not that 
it would be easy to negotiation, or that it could be done without bravery on 
all sides – in the North, in the South, and among the NGOs as well.  But 
legitimately defined, such an accord would not endanger the development 
of the poor. 
The politics of all this is fairly stunning.  Suffice it to make two final, 
closely related points.  First, the obligations calculated by GDR, or by any 
other such system, must inevitably be translated into measurable, 
reportable, and verifiable financial transfers.  In part these are for adaptation 
assistance, but in the first instance they much be for mitigation, because our 
goal has to be nothing less than the complete decarbonization of the 
economy – the global economy – within this century.  There’s a lot to be said 
about these international financial transfers, but two points in particular is 
critical: (1) they will be large; and (2) managing them properly is going to 
one of the greatest institutional challenges of all time.  What kind of 
institutions will we need to face that challenge?  The only brief answer is “all 
25. This is a 2010 projection.  China’s obligations increase rapidly in pro-
jections that, like those of the International Energy Agency, assume that its rapid 
growth will continue.  See Baer, supra note 23, chart titled GDR Results for Representative 
Countries and Groups. 
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sorts of institutions,” and all of them will have to be well-designed and well-
regulated.  This means that fund-based institutions will have to be 
effectively and democratically managed, which, as history has shown, is 
easier said than done.  It also means that market-based institutions will 
have to generate real physical emissions reductions under a global cap.  
Second, it’s no accident that GDR entails a progressive global tax.  It is 
quite impossible to avoid the conclusion that if we indeed wish to escape 
the climate trap the wealthy must pay, but to make this possible, it’s equally 
clear that this cannot simply mean rich world subsidies for developing world 
transitions.  Even within the implacable logic of the North/South climate 
impasse, class matters and is indeed inescapable.  Which is to say that, for 
example, it is impossible to imagine that the US will ever reach a working 
consensus to pay its large fraction of the total global mitigation and 
adaption “bill” if the “wealthy” people in the Indian and Chinese nations are 
not also paying their “fair shares.”  
In the end, only a few things matter.  One is that we are entirely 
justified in speaking of a global climate emergency.  The other is that, even 
when resorting to such “hot” language, we do nothing to cede our right to 
the language of hope.  Which is why, among all the analogies now being 
invoked to speak of the necessary mobilization – e.g., an Apollo Project, a 
Marshall Plan – the best may well be the US WWII mobilization, especially 
the “New Deal” that made it possible.  It’s particularly apt because that 
mobilization had a great deal to do with justice, with opportunity, with the 
solidarity of real as well as imaginary community.  And if anything is clear 
about the climate mobilization, it’s that solidarity will figure large this time 
around as well. 
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